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Lauchlin Currie was born on 8 October 1902 in West Dublin, Nova Scotia, and died 
in Bogotá, Colombia, on 23 December 1993 after an unusually long and varied career 
as an academic economist and top-level policy adviser. After two years at St Francis 
Xavier University, Nova Scotia, 1920–2, he moved to the London School of 
Economics (LSE), where his teachers included Edwin Cannan, Hugh Dalton, A. L. 
Bowley, R. H. Tawney and Harold Laski. In 1925 he obtained his BsC and moved to 
Harvard, where the chief inspiration for his Ph.D. thesis, ‘Bank Assets and Banking 
Theory’ (January 1931), was Allyn Abbott Young. However, when Young moved to 
the LSE in 1927 his formal supervisor was John H. Williams. 
 
He remained at Harvard until 1934 as teaching assistant to Williams, Ralph Hawtrey 
and Joseph Schumpeter. His Ph.D. thesis attacked the ‘commercial loan’ or ‘needs of 
trade’ theory of banking by showing that it was not only unsound in theory but had 
been more honoured in the breach than the observance – until its disastrous influence 
on monetary policy in the late 1920s and early 1930s. 
 
In a January 1932 memorandum, Currie, Harry Dexter White and Paul Theodore 
Ellsworth presented a radical anti-depression programme (see Laidler and Sandilands, 
2002). In keeping with their explanation of the contraction as due to a collapsing 
money supply, they urged vigorous open-market operations and deficit spending 
financed by money creation. This memorandum was part of an early Harvard 
influence (through Young, Hawtrey, Williams and Currie; see Laidler, 1999) on what 
had been claimed as a unique Chicago monetary tradition. 
 
In Currie (1933a) he showed the hopeless confusion that resulted from the ambiguity 
of the word ‘credit’. He stressed control over the quantity of money (defined as cash 
plus demand deposits, for which there had been no estimates until Currie published a 
series in 1934) rather than the quantity or quality of credit or loans. He also computed 
the first estimate of the income velocity of money in the United States (Currie, 
1933b), with an explanation of its cyclical variations. 
 
His ‘The Failure of Monetary Policy to Prevent the Depression of 1929–32’ (1934a) 
fully anticipated Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz's (1963) diagnosis of this 
period. He argued that apart from the stock market there were none of the traditional 
signs of a boom in the 1920s. Tight monetary policies had been ineffectual in 
checking the rise in stock prices but only too effective in contributing to the decline in 
building activity and the pressure on foreign countries that preceded the Depression. 
 
He also demonstrated the perverse elasticity of money in the business cycle due to 
differences in reserve requirements for different classes of bank and bank deposit 
(1934b). In the face of the banks' reserve losses in 1929–32 and their abhorrence of 
heavy indebtedness to the reserve banks, the administration's policy was ‘one of 
almost complete passivity and quiescence’, so the self-generating forces of the 
Depression continued unchecked. 
 
In 1934 Jacob Viner recruited him to the ‘freshman brain trust’ at the US Treasury 
where he developed a blueprint for a system of 100 per cent reserves against demand 
deposits, to break the link between the lending and the creation of money and to 
strengthen central bank control (see Phillips, 1995). Later that year Marriner Eccles, 
the new governor of the Federal Reserve Board, hired Currie as his top adviser, from 
1934 to 1939. (Many of his memoranda to Eccles are published in Sandilands, 2004.) 
 
At the Fed Currie drafted what became the 1935 Banking Act that gave the Fed 
increased powers to raise reserve requirements. In 1936–7 these powers were used, 
‘as a precautionary measure’, to reduce the huge build-up of banks' excess reserves. 
This has been widely blamed for the sharp recession of 1937–8, a view Currie 
consistently rejected (1938). Instead, he invoked his newly constructed ‘net federal 
income-creating expenditure series’ (1935; and see Sweezy, 1972) to show the 
strategic role of fiscal policy in complementing monetary policy to revive an acutely 
depressed economy. In November 1937 he had a four-hour meeting with President 
Roosevelt to explain that the recession was due to sharp fiscal contraction and that 
balancing the budget was not the way to restore business confidence. He insisted on 
the need for better coordination of monetary and fiscal policy. In May 1939 the 
rationale for this was explained in theoretical and statistical detail by Currie and Alvin 
Hansen (respectively ‘Mr Inside’ and ‘Mr Outside’, according to Tobin, 1976), in 
joint testimony before the Temporary National Economic Committee. 
 
From 1939 to 1945, Currie was President Roosevelt's special adviser on economic 
affairs in the White House. He was also in charge of lend-lease to China, 1941–3, and 
ran the Foreign Economic Administration, 1943–4. In early 1945 he headed a 
tripartite (United States, British and French) mission to Bern to persuade the Swiss to 
freeze Nazi bank balances and stop shipments of German supplies through 
Switzerland to the Italian front. He was also closely involved in loan negotiations with 
British and Soviet allies and in preparations for the 1944 Bretton Woods conference 
(staged primarily by his friend Harry White). 
 
After the war it was alleged by Elizabeth Bentley, an ex-Soviet agent, that Currie and 
White had participated in Soviet espionage. Though she had never met them herself, 
she claimed they had passed information to other Washington economists who were 
abetting her own espionage, and that they probably knew this. White and Currie were 
heavily involved in official wartime cooperation with the Soviets, but Bentley put a 
sinister interpretation on these activities. They appeared together before the House 
Committee on Un-American Activities in August 1948 to rebut Bentley's charges. 
Their testimony satisfied the Committee at that time, though the strain contributed to 
the fatal heart attack that White suffered three days after the hearing. 
 
No charges were laid against Currie, and in 1949 he headed a major World Bank 
survey of Colombia. In 1950 the Colombians invited him to return to Bogotá, where 
he remained for most of the next 40 years as a top presidential adviser. He has been 
falsely accused of fleeing the United States to avoid charges of disloyalty. In fact in 
December 1952 he was a witness before a grand jury in New York investigating 
Owen Lattimore's role in the famous Amerasia case that involved the publication of 
secret State Department documents by that magazine, though his next visit to the 
United States was not until 1961 when he had a meeting in the White House with 
Walt Rostow, then President Kennedy's National Security Adviser, to discuss a 
development plan for Colombia. 
 
By that time Currie had assumed Colombian citizenship (personally conferred on him 
by President Alberto Lleras in 1958), partly because in 1954 the US government had 
refused to renew his passport, ostensibly because he was only a naturalized US citizen 
and was now residing abroad. However, the reality was probably connected with the 
then secret ‘Venona’ project that had deciphered wartime Soviet cables that 
mentioned Currie. The related cases of Currie and White are discussed in Sandilands 
(2000) and Boughton and Sandilands (2003), where it is shown that the evidence 
against them is far from conclusive. After reading the latter paper, Major-General 
Julius Kobyakov, deputy director of the KGB's American desk in the late 1980s, 
wrote to the present writer on 22 December 2003 to confirm our conclusions. After 




    there was nothing in [Currie's] file to suggest that he had ever wittingly 
collaborated with the Soviet intelligence… However, in the spirit of machismo, many 
people claimed that we had an ‘agent’ in the White House. Among the members of 
my profession there is a sacramental question: ‘Does he know that he is our agent?’ 
There is very strong indication that neither Currie nor White knew that. 
 
 
There were two breaks to Currie's advisory and academic work in Colombia: during a 
military dictatorship, 1953–8, he retired to develop a prize-winning herd of Holstein 
cattle; and from 1966 to 1971 he was a professor at Michigan State (1966), Simon 
Fraser (1967–8 and 1969–71), Glasgow (1968–9), and Oxford (1969) universities. He 
returned permanently to Colombia in 1971 at the behest of President Misael Pastrana 
to prepare a national plan of development known as the Plan of the Four Strategies, 
with a focus on urban housing and export diversification. The plan was implemented 
and the institutions that were established in support of the plan played a major role in 
accelerating Colombia's urbanization. 
 
He remained as chief economist at the National Planning Department for ten years, 
1971–81, followed by 12 years at the Colombian Institute of Savings and Housing 
until his death in 1993. There he defended the unique index-linked housing finance 
system (based on ‘units of constant purchasing power’ for both savers and borrowers) 
that he had established in 1972. The system thus continued to boost Colombia's 
growth rate and urban employment opportunities year by year. Currie was also a top 
adviser on urban planning, and played a major part in the first United Nations Habitat 
conference in Vancouver in 1976. His ‘cities-within-the-city’ urban design and 
financing proposals (including the public recapture of land's socially created 
‘valorización’, or ‘unearned land value increments’, as cities grow) were elaborated in 
Taming the Megalopolis (1976). To the time of his death he was a regular teacher at 
the National University of Colombia, Javeriana University, and the University of the 
Andes, and continued to publish widely (a comprehensive bibliography is in 
Sandilands, 1990, reviewed by Charles Kindleberger, 1991). His writings and policy 
advice were heavily influenced by his old Harvard mentor, Allyn Young. Notable is 
his posthumous (1997) paper that offers a unique macroeconomic interpretation of 
Youngian increasing returns and the endogenous nature of self-sustaining growth. 
